Don’t Rock the Boat: Developing a Uniform System of MaritimePunitive Damages After Baker and Townsend by Serigne, Josie N.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 79 | Number 1
The Fourteenth Amendment:
150 Years Later
A Symposium of the Louisiana Law Review
Fall 2018
Don’t Rock the Boat: Developing a Uniform
System of MaritimePunitive Damages After Baker
and Townsend
Josie N. Serigne
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Josie N. Serigne, Don’t Rock the Boat: Developing a Uniform System of MaritimePunitive Damages After Baker and Townsend, 79 La. L.
Rev. (2019)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol79/iss1/12
 
 
Don’t Rock the Boat: Developing a Uniform System 
of Maritime Punitive Damages After Baker and 
Townsend 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 Introduction .................................................................................. 328 
I. The Power Struggle: An Overview of “The Law Applied” 
in Admiralty ................................................................................. 332 
 A. Allocation of Maritime Lawmaking Authority 
Among Sovereigns ................................................................. 332 
 1. Federal Lawmaking Authority  ....................................... 334 
 2. State Lawmaking Authority ............................................ 335 
 B. State Law Application in Maritime Cases ............................. 337 
II. Nature and Scope of the Problem: The Quest for  
Federal-State Comity as Applied to Punitive Damage 
Availability in Maritime Torts ..................................................... 339 
 A. The Status of Punitive Damages After Miles, Baker, 
and Townsend ........................................................................ 339 
 B. Non-Seamen Maritime Torts: A Much-Needed  
Reconciliation of General Maritime Law and  
State Law Punitive Damages ................................................. 342 
III. Navigating the States’ Role in Maritime Punitive 
Damages ....................................................................................... 344 
 A. Availability of General Maritime Law Punitive 
Damages in Non-Seamen Maritime Torts in  
Territorial Waters ................................................................... 345 
 1. Examination of the Court’s Decisions in Baker 
and Townsend .................................................................. 345 
 2. Baker and Townsend as Applied to Non-Seamen 
Maritime Torts in Territorial Waters ............................... 350 
 B. Availability of State Punitive Damage Remedies in 
Non-Seamen Maritime Torts in Territorial Waters ............... 353 
IV. Time to Calm the Waters Through Implementation of a 
Uniform System of Maritime Punitive Damages ......................... 357 
 A. Synopsis of Potential Issues Raised by State  
Law Punitive Damages Under the Maritime  
Preemption Analysis .............................................................. 359 
 1. Degree of Culpable Conduct Required ........................... 360 
 2. Permissibility of Vicarious Punitive Damages ................ 362 
328 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
 
 
 3. Ratio of Compensatory to Punitive Damages ................. 363 
 B. Observation: State Law is Inapplicable to Maritime 
Punitive Damages After Baker and Townsend ...................... 367 
 Conclusion .................................................................................... 367 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 7, 2005, Derek Hebert was one of several passengers in a 
small boat operated by Daniel Vamvoras.1 They were in a former channel 
of the Calcasieu River in Lake Charles, Louisiana, traveling between 
Vamvoras’ home and the Lake Charles Country Club.2 While the boat was 
“on plane,”3 the hydraulic steering system failed because of fluid loss. The 
boat whipped around violently, ejecting Hebert and four other passengers. 
The “kill switch”4 on the boat was not engaged, and the propeller struck 
Hebert 19 times, ultimately resulting in his death. 
These are the facts of Warren v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co.,5 a 
recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision. Warren is remarkably evocative 
of the 1996 United States Supreme Court case, Yamaha Motor Corp. v. 
Calhoun.6 Yamaha involved a minor, Natalie Calhoun, who died in a jet 
ski accident in the “territorial waters” of Puerto Rico.7 Because the 
accident occurred upon the navigable waterways of the United States, 
admiralty jurisdiction and general maritime law applied to the wrongful 
death case.8 To increase potential recovery, Natalie’s parents argued for 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2018, by JOSIE N. SERIGNE. 
 1. Warren v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 233 So. 3d 568, 571 (La. 2017). 
 2. Id. 
 3. “On plane” means that the boat was traveling at a sufficiently high rate of 
speed to cause the hull to rise out of the water. Id. 
 4. The “kill switch,” or “engine safety cut-out switch,” is a device used, in 
the event of a passenger being thrown from the boat, to stop the engine and prevent 
injury from the spinning propeller. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996). 
 7. “Territorial waters” are waters within the territorial limits of a State, as 
well as the coastal waters fewer than three nautical miles from the shore of a State. 
See, e.g., Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F.3d 622, 624 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(quoting William C. Brown III, Problems Arising from the Intersection of 
Traditional Maritime Law and Aviation Death and Personal Injury, 68 TUL. L. 
REV. 577, 581 (1994)). 
 8. Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 206 (“‘With admiralty jurisdiction,’ we have often 
said, ‘comes the application of substantive admiralty law.’”) (quoting E. River 
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application of their resident state’s wrongful death statute and its 
accompanying remedies.9 The Court agreed and determined that state law 
remedies, which included punitive damages against the manufacturer of 
the jet ski, remained available to supplement general maritime law for 
wrongful deaths of “non-seamen” in territorial waters.10 
Like Calhoun’s parents in Yamaha, Hebert’s father sought to recover 
punitive damages from the manufacturer of the boat’s steering system in 
Warren.11 He brought the claim under general maritime law rather than 
state law.12 Such a minute difference regarding the source of the claim 
does not seem particularly significant at first glance—the desired remedy 
                                                                                                             
S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986)). The terms 
“admiralty” and “maritime” are used interchangeably. Any appearance of the two 
words throughout this Comment only reflects customary usage in a unique area 
of law. See FRANK L. MARAIST ET AL., ADMIRALTY IN A NUTSHELL 1 (7th ed. 
2017) (“Admiralty or maritime law is one of the world’s oldest bodies of law.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 9. Because Natalie Calhoun’s permanent residence was in Pennsylvania, her 
estate and parents brought suit under Pennsylvania wrongful death and survival 
statutes, which allowed more potential recovery than federal maritime law. 
Available remedies included loss of future earnings, loss of society, support and 
services, funeral expenses, and punitive damages. Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 202. 
 10. See id. at 199. Punitive damages are generally defined as those damages 
assessed in addition to compensatory damages to punish the defendant for 
aggravated or outrageous misconduct, and to deter the defendant and others from 
similar conduct in the future. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 
(1979). Although an entire body of case law interprets this term, generally a 
“seaman” is a “member of the crew of a vessel.” Notably, seamen have a right of 
action against their employers under the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. § 30104). See 
MARAIST, supra note 8, at 215. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has defined a 
“non-seaman” as a person, such as a recreational boater, who is neither a seaman 
under the Jones Act nor a longshoreman under the Longshore and Harbor 
Workers’ Compensation Act. Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 205 n.2. 
 11. The father specifically claimed that the manufacturer demonstrated a 
callous disregard for the safety of others because it knew of the system’s flaws 
but failed to provide warnings in order to avoid “mass hysteria.” Warren v. Shelter 
Mut. Ins. Co., 196 So. 3d 776 (La. Ct. App. 2016). 
 12. Louisiana law does not recognize claims for punitive damages in such 
wrongful death actions. See, e.g., McCoy v. Ark. Nat. Gas Co., 143 So. 383, 385–
86 (La. 1932) (“There is no authority in the law of Louisiana for allowing punitive 
damages in any case, unless it be for some particular wrong for which a statute 
expressly authorizes the imposition of some such penalty.”); see generally John W. 
deGravelles & J. Neale deGravelles, Louisiana Punitive Damages – A Conflict of 
Traditions, 70 LA. L. REV. 579, 585 (2010) (discussing Louisiana’s general refusal 
to impose punitive damages as a reflection of the civil law tradition). 
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is the same, and general maritime law applied because of the presence of 
admiralty jurisdiction.13 The recovery of punitive damages, however, is a 
considerably murky area of general maritime law.14 The 1990 Supreme 
Court case Miles v. Apex Marine Corp. sparked decades of controversial 
rulings, during which lower courts denied the overall availability of 
punitive damages under general maritime law.15 The tide shifted in Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker and Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, signaling 
the Court’s rejection of an overly expansive interpretation of Miles and 
approval of maritime punitive damages, at least under the facts of those 
cases.16 Neither Baker nor Townsend involved non-seamen killed or 
injured in territorial waters; as a result, cases such as Warren raise several 
important questions regarding the interplay between Miles, Yamaha, 
Baker, and Townsend.17  
A closer look at Yamaha reveals that the decision only permits the use 
of state law to provide a supplementary remedial option for non-seamen 
injured or killed in territorial waters.18 Yet, after Baker and Townsend, 
punitive damages may be available to those claimants under general 
                                                                                                             
 13. See, e.g., E. River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 864 (citing Exec. Jet Aviation, 
Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 255 (1972)). 
 14. See discussion infra Part II. 
 15. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990). 
 16. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) (holding that 
fishermen could recover punitive damages under general maritime law for pure 
economic harm following the Exxon Valdez oil spill); see also Atl. Sounding Co. 
v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009) (holding that a Jones Act seaman has a general 
maritime law punitive damages remedy for willful failure to pay maintenance and 
cure). See MARAIST, supra note 8, at 179. 
 17. See generally Baker, 554 U.S. 471; Townsend, 557 U.S. 404. 
 18. Yamaha is factually limited to general maritime wrongful death actions, 
but this Comment takes the majority view that state law remedies are available in 
similar non-seamen personal injury actions. Indeed, after Yamaha, a “trend” 
developed, with many lower courts allowing non-seamen claimants injured in 
state territorial waters to supplement their remedies under general maritime law 
with applicable state remedies. See In re Consol. Coal Co., 228 F. Supp. 2d 764, 
771–72 (N.D. W.Va. 2001) (reasoning that because Congress had not prescribed 
specific remedies, state remedies could be used to supplement general maritime 
law where a personal injury claimant in a product liability case against the 
manufacturer sought punitive damages and West Virginia permitted recovery of 
such damages); see also Taylor v. Costa Cruises, Inc., No. 90 Civ. 2630, 1996 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22510, at *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1996) (following Yamaha 
in a non-seamen personal injury case and denying defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment because federal maritime law does not preempt application of 
state law remedies). 
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maritime law.19 If available under general maritime law, the only practical 
reason to apply state law is that state substantive rules on punitive damages 
are more generous than general maritime law.20 Yamaha, however, does 
not govern this issue.21 Under the Supreme Court’s landmark choice-of-
law decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, the use of state substantive 
law is permissible only if federal maritime law does not preempt its 
application.22 This Comment argues that although Yamaha provides an 
additional avenue to recover punitive damages for non-seamen maritime 
torts in territorial waters, Baker and Townsend have rendered it 
unnecessary.23  
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the sources of 
maritime law, which reflect the competing federal and state powers in 
admiralty. Section A recognizes the split between federal and state 
lawmaking authority, and Section B surveys principles whereby the 
Supreme Court has attempted to delineate the boundaries of such 
authority. Further, Section B details the maritime preemption analysis 
espoused in Jensen and subsequent developments.24 Part II demonstrates 
the need to reconcile the Supreme Court’s case law and clarify the state’s 
role in maritime punitive damages for non-seamen maritime torts in 
territorial waters. Section A focuses on the historical development of 
maritime punitive damages, including Miles’s influence, and their current 
status after Baker and Townsend. Section B discusses Yamaha and its 
accompanying choice-of-law considerations that further complicate the 
issue of punitive damages in admiralty.  
Part III of this Comment attempts to reconcile the complex reasonings 
of Miles, Yamaha, Baker, and Townsend. Section A explains the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Baker and Townsend and considers their impact on 
non-seamen maritime tort cases in territorial waters. Section B shifts the 
focus to the Yamaha decision, analyzing the extent to which its fact-based 
rationale affects preemption. Part IV analyzes Yamaha’s limited utility in 
the wake of Baker and Townsend and potential issues that application of 
state law under the maritime preemption analysis raises. Ultimately, this 
                                                                                                             
 19. See discussion infra Part III. 
 20. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 21. See supra text accompanying note 18. 
 22. See generally S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). 
 23. See discussion infra Part IV. For purposes of this Comment, the phrase 
“maritime torts” is used as a comprehensive term to refer to both personal injury 
and wrongful death suits falling within admiralty jurisdiction. The two causes of 
action are separate; if the author uses the more specific term, the relevant 
discussion is limited to that particular cause of action. 
 24. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 215–16. 
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Comment concludes by advocating for the establishment of a single, 
uniform system of maritime punitive damages. 
I. THE POWER STRUGGLE: AN OVERVIEW OF “THE LAW APPLIED” IN 
ADMIRALTY 
The possible role of state law in punitive damage claims in maritime 
cases turns on two preliminary issues. First, the relationship between 
Congress, the federal courts, and the states regarding lawmaking authority 
in admiralty lays the foundation for an explanation of the maritime 
preemption analysis adopted in Jensen.25 Second, maritime preemption 
and its development through federal case law demonstrates that state law 
may apply only in certain circumstances.26  
A. Allocation of Maritime Lawmaking Authority Among Sovereigns 
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, also known as 
the Admiralty Grant, provides that “[t]he judicial power [of the United 
States] shall extend . . . to all cases of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction.”27 The Judiciary Act of 1789 endowed the courts of the 
United States with original jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases 
and simultaneously acknowledged and preserved the authority of state 
courts.28 As amended, the Act remains largely unchanged and still 
qualifies the grant of exclusive admiralty jurisdiction to federal courts by 
“saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are 
otherwise entitled.”29 Under the “saving to suitors” clause, a litigant 
                                                                                                             
 25. Id. 
 26. See Ronen Perry, Differential Preemption, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 821, 842–46 
(2011) (discussing cases). 
 27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. For a historical explanation of this provision, 
see DAVID W. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM: HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 
OF PROBLEMS OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN THE MARITIME LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES 6–17 (Harry W. Jones ed., Foundation Press, Inc. 1970). 
 28. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76 (1789) (“That the district courts 
shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several States . . . exclusive original 
cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction . . . within 
their respective districts as well as upon the high seas; saving to suitors, in all 
cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to 
give it.”). 
 29. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006) (“District courts shall have original jurisdiction, 
exclusive of the courts of the States, of: (1) any civil case of admiralty or maritime 
jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are 
otherwise entitled.”).  
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receives the right of a common law remedy, which is virtually any in 
personam remedy.30 As a result, the clause is interpreted as “leav[ing] . . . 
state courts competent [through concurrent jurisdiction] to adjudicate 
maritime causes of action in proceedings in personam.”31  
The extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime 
injuries, however, is constrained by the “reverse-Erie” doctrine, which 
requires that the state substantive remedies conform to governing federal 
maritime standards.32 Despite the “saving to suitors” clause, the Framers 
intended the constitutional grant to determine applicable law, as its 
purpose was to protect maritime commerce through uniformity and 
consistency.33 Thus, a foundational principle in maritime law is that 
                                                                                                             
 30. Proceedings for remedies in personam are against the person, as opposed 
to those which are against specific things, or in rem. For example, the most 
common claim within the clause is an action in personam to recover damages for 
a tort. See Panama R. Co. v. Vasquez, 271 U.S. 557 (1926); see also Intagliata v. 
Shipowners & Mers. Tow Boat Co., 26 Cal. 2d 365 (1945). 
 31. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222; Bergeron v. 
Quality Shipyards, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. La. 1991). See David P. Currie, 
Federalism and the Admiralty: “The Devil’s Own Mess”, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 
158, 169; see also David W. Robertson, The Applicability of State Law in 
Maritime Cases After Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 81, 84 
(1996); David W. Robertson, Displacement of State Law by Federal Maritime 
Law, 26 J. MAR. L. & COM. 325, 328, 332 (1995). 
 32. Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 223. The Erie doctrine requires a federal 
court exercising diversity jurisdiction to apply the appropriate substantive law of 
the forum state, but allows the court to apply federal procedural law. Erie R.R. 
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). The “reverse-Erie” doctrine applies to 
maritime cases. See, e.g., Peter Thompson, State Courts and State Law: A New 
Force in Admiralty?, 8 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 223, 230 (1996). Literally understood, 
the “reverse-Erie” doctrine requires state courts, when adjudicating a maritime 
case, to apply the relevant substantive maritime law rather than state law. See, 
e.g., Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 384 (1918) (requiring a state 
court to apply the federal maritime law in determining the rights of an injured 
seaman). Courts generally do not apply the doctrine strictly, however, allowing 
state law to prevail over conflicting maritime law in some instances. See S. Pac. 
Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917) (developing a three-prong test to 
determine when state law may apply over federal maritime law). 
 33. See, e.g., The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 574 (1874) (“The 
general system of maritime law which was familiar to the lawyers and statesmen 
of the country when the Constitution was adopted, was [referred to] . . . when it 
was declared . . . that the judicial power of the United States shall extend ‘to all 
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.’”); see also Chelentis, 247 U.S. 372. 
See generally B.J. Haeck, Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun: An Examination of 
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generally, “[w]ith admiralty jurisdiction comes the application of 
substantive admiralty law.”34 “Substantive admiralty law” is a consolidation 
of federal statutes and federal judge-made law, with some state law 
remaining applicable under the proper circumstances in the admiralty 
context.35  
To fully understand the legal significance and inevitable consequences 
of this trifold framework, it is necessary to categorize maritime lawmaking 
authority according to its respective sovereign. 
1. Federal Lawmaking Authority  
An internal power struggle exists between the legislative and judicial 
branches of the federal government in the context of admiralty law.36 
Congress has broad legislative power to create rules governing admiralty 
cases, although the Constitution does not expressly grant it any power over 
civil maritime law.37 Pursuant to a combination of constitutional 
provisions—the Necessary and Proper Clause, the Admiralty Clause, and 
the Commerce Clause38—Congress has “paramount power to fix and 
                                                                                                             
Jurisdiction, Choice-of-Laws, and Federal Interests in Maritime Law, 72 WASH. 
L. REV. 181 (1997). 
 34. See, e.g., E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 
864 (1986) (citing Exec. Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 255 
(1972)). 
 35. See discussion infra Part I.B.2. See also 1 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, 
ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW, § 4-1, at 220 (5th ed. 2011) (citing cases). 
 36. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (supporting 
the notion that Congress’s regulatory authority is not limited or defined by the 
admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts). 
 37. See Gus A. Schill, Jr., A Tribute to United States Circuit Judge John R. 
Brown, 25 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 239, 273–84 (2003) (discussing the foundation for 
Congress’s role in formulating general maritime law, while also recognizing a 
lack of express authority in the Constitution). 
 38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. (Congress has the power to “make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States . . . .”). 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (Congress has the power to craft the rules of decision for 
maritime cases because the Constitution vests admiralty jurisdiction in the federal 
courts). U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. (Congress has the power to “regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States”). Commentators 
believe generally that this grant of legislative authority includes maritime 
commerce. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824) (“The power 
of Congress, then, comprehends navigation . . . so far as that navigation may be, 
in any manner, connected with ‘commerce with foreign nations, or among the 
several States. . . .’”); see also Lizabeth L. Burrell, Application of State Law to 
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determine the maritime law . . . .”39 When Congress exercises this authority 
and legislates on a particular maritime issue, the federal courts must defer 
to its judgment.40  
Where Congress has not exercised its legislative authority, however, 
federal courts retain the authority to fashion federal judge-made law.41 
Through the Admiralty Clause and its primary purpose of uniformity, the 
Framers recognized that the Supreme Court needed the authority to 
implement and develop the “general maritime law,” which is “drawn from 
state and federal sources” and constitutes “an amalgam of traditional 
common law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created 
rules.”42 As a result, the Constitution empowers federal courts to both draw 
on substantive maritime law in its adjudicatory functions and “continue 
the development of this law within constitutional limits.”43  
2. State Lawmaking Authority 
Although the broad constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction to 
federal courts covers all “navigable waters” of the United States, that 
jurisdiction coexists with state sovereignty over waters within its own 
                                                                                                             
Maritime Claims: Is There a Better Guide than Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen?, 
21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 53, 53 n.1 (1996) (arguing that Congress’s power derives from 
the Commerce Clause). 
 39. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917). 
 40. See generally Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 
(1959); see also Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 27 (1990) (“Congress 
retains superior authority in [matters of maritime law], and an admiralty court 
must be vigilant not to overstep the well-considered boundaries imposed by 
federal legislation.”). 
 41. As Justice Marshall stated, “the law, admiralty and maritime, as it has 
existed for ages, is applied by our Courts to the cases as they arise.” Am. Ins. Co. 
v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511, 545–46 (1828). 
 42. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986); 
The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575–76 (1874). 
 43. The St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. 522, 526 (1861); Romero, 358 U.S. at 360–61; 
see also Currie, supra note 31, at 162 (“[The admiralty grant] gives the federal 
courts power to evolve and apply a national substantive law.”); Robertson, 
Diplacement of State Law by Federal Maritime Law, supra note 31, at 366 
(“Admiralty’s traditions emphasize the authority and duty of federal judges to 
create maritime law.”). But see Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal 
Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1639, 1643–44 (2008) (suggesting that 
federal lawmaking power in admiralty derives directly from “strong federal 
interests in uniform rules to govern maritime commerce,” rather than indirectly 
from the jurisdictional grant). 
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territory.44 The saving to suitors clause, as interpreted, not only confers 
concurrent jurisdiction to state courts, but also recognizes the legitimate 
role of the states in regulating maritime affairs.45 A long-standing principle 
of federal constitutional law also recognizes that the states possess certain 
“police powers” to enact legislation to protect “the lives, limbs, health, 
comfort, and quiet of all persons [within the state].”46 State maritime 
legislation often falls within the states’ police powers.47 Consequently, 
states have retained at least some degree of lawmaking authority within 
the ambit of federal admiralty jurisdiction.48  
Despite the legitimate interest of a state in upholding its own law, 
differing state laws may be incompatible with federal maritime statutes, 
judge-made general maritime law, and the goal of uniformity, which has 
proven to be “a brooding omnipresence” over the sea.49 The key concern 
                                                                                                             
 44. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870) (deeming waters to 
be “navigable” when used, or susceptible of being used, in their ordinary 
conditions as highways for commerce—both international and interstate in 
nature); United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336, 388–89 (1818) 
(disposing of the argument that the grant of admiralty jurisdiction itself ousted 
state regulatory authority over territorial waters). 
 45. Romero, 358 U.S. at 374 (“The State and Federal Governments jointly exert 
regulatory power today as they have played joint roles in the development of 
maritime law throughout [the nation’s] history. This sharing of competence in one 
aspect of […] federalism has been traditionally embodied in the saving clause of the 
Act of 1789.”); see also Ellenwood v. Exxon Shipping Co., 984 F.2d 1270, 1279 
(1st Cir. 1993) (“[W]hen Congress established a separate admiralty jurisdiction and 
empowered the judiciary to develop substantive maritime principles for use 
nationwide . . . it simultaneously assured that state law would continue to play some 
role in maritime affairs through the ‘saving to suitors’ clause.”). For a general 
background on the clause, see discussion supra Part I.A. 
 46. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (quoting Metro. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985)); Sligh v. Kirkood, 237 U.S. 52, 58 
(1915) (“[T]here may be legitimate action by the state in the matter of local 
regulation, which the state may take until Congress exercises its authority upon the 
subject.”). 
 47. See Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 
330 (1999) (citing examples). 
 48. See Steven R. Swanson, Federalism, the Admiralty, and Oil Spills, 27 J. 
MAR. L. & COM. 379, 381–82 (1996) (“While there is a national concern for 
maritime activities, the states clearly retain an interest in that industry’s effects 
within their borders. The states have passed a great deal of legislation relating to 
these interests.”). 
 49. See generally ROBERTSON, supra note 27, at 193 (“Until Jensen and 
Chelentis, the maritime law of the United States was a code of jurisdiction, procedure, 
and remedies. After those cases, it was a brooding omnipresence over the sea.”). 
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then becomes the boundaries of state lawmaking authority in relation to 
relevant federal interests, raising the unavoidable question of the 
circumstances that must exist for federal law to “preempt” state law.50 
B. State Law Application in Maritime Cases 
The Supreme Court stated in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen: “[I]t 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to define with exactness just how far 
the general maritime law may be changed, modified, or affected by state 
legislation. That this may be done to some extent cannot be denied.”51 
Despite this assertion, the Jensen Court attempted to draw some 
boundaries and identified three circumstances in which courts may not 
apply state law in an admiralty case.52 Federal maritime law preempts state 
law if the state law meets one of three prongs: (1) it “contravenes the 
essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress”; (2) it “works material 
prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law”; or (3) 
it “interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its 
international and interstate relations.”53  
The first two prongs of Jensen are clear, relating to the statutory 
maritime law and certain federal principles that originated in admiralty or 
otherwise enjoy select application.54 The third prong is more open-ended 
                                                                                                             
 50. This Comment uses the word “preemption” to refer to the issue of 
legislatively and judicially created federal maritime law’s effect on state law, as 
opposed to “displacement,” which considers the impact of a federal maritime 
statute on a general maritime law claim. See Thomas C. Galligan & Brittan J. 
Bush, Displacement and Preemption: The OPA’s Effect on General Maritime Law 
and State Tort Law Punitive Damages Claims, 42 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 9 (2012) 
(using the same terms); but see SCHOENBAUM, supra note 35, § 4-3, at 233 
(referring to the same concepts as “horizontal preemption” and “vertical 
preemption”). 
 51. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917). In American Dredging 
Co. v. Miller, Justice Scalia admitted that “[i]t would be idle to pretend that the 
line separating permissible from impermissible state regulation is readily 
discernable in . . . admiralty jurisprudence, or indeed is even entirely consistent 
within . . . admiralty jurisprudence.” 510 U.S. 443, 452 (1994). Likewise, a lower 
court judge stated that “tack[ing] a sailboat into a fog bank” would be easier than 
discerning the law in this area. Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 
623, 624 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 52. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See e.g., Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 449–50 (1994) 
(holding that a legal rule or principle is a “characteristic feature of general 
maritime law” only if it originated or has exclusive application in maritime law).  
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and echoes the idea, pervasive in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, that 
the development of a uniform maritime law is required to protect maritime 
commerce.55 Contrarily, this notion of uniformity does not mandate the 
automatic preemption of state law.56 The Supreme Court has declined to 
create a bright-line test, choosing instead to balance the competing, 
legitimate interests of both sovereigns.57 Under the third prong of Jensen, 
therefore, state law will generally not apply if it conflicts with general 
maritime law.58 Conflicting state law may apply, however, when the state 
has a strong interest in the application of its law and uniformity is not 
required.59 
                                                                                                             
 55. Joel K. Goldstein, The Life and Times of Wilburn Boat: A Critical Guide 
(Part II), 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 555, 556 (1997) (noting that uniformity and 
predictability encourage maritime commerce). 
 56. See, e.g., Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 
U.S. 527, 545–47 (1995) (emphasizing that the “exercise of federal admiralty 
jurisdiction does not result in automatic displacement of state law” because there 
is a “highly intricate interplay of the State and the National Government in their 
regulation of maritime commerce”). A difference exists between federal law 
incorporating state law as a rule of decision (“borrowing”) and state law operating 
of its own force. See Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F.3d 622, 627–28 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (citing cases). “[A]lthough drawing such a distinction identifies the 
sovereign “power” being exercised,” it is of theoretical importance only and “does 
not have any real bearing on the practical question of whether the state law rule 
of decision will apply or be [preempted].” Calhoun, 40 F.3d at 628; see also Boyle 
v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 n.3 (1988) (“We refer here to the 
displacement of state law, although it is possible to analyze it as the displacement 
of federal-law reference to state law for the rule of decision. We see nothing to be 
gained by expanding the theoretical scope of the federal pre-emption beyond its 
practical effect, and so adopt the more modest terminology. If the distinction 
between displacement of state law and displacement of federal law’s 
incorporation of state law ever makes a practical difference, it at least does not do 
so in the present case.”). This Comment thus refers to the problem generally as 
“preemption of state law.” 
 57. See, e.g., Rodrigue v. LeGros, 563 So. 2d 248, 253 (La. 1990) (“Despite 
this multitude of cases involving the applicability of state law in maritime 
situations, the Court has developed no clear test for determining when such 
application is appropriate and when it violates the Constitution.”); see also 
Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 210 n.8 (1996) (“We attempt no 
grand synthesis or reconciliation of our precedent.”). 
 58. Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 628 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917)). 
 59. See id. at 628–29 (citing cases). For purposes of this Comment, a court’s 
analysis to resolve identified conflict in the applicable law is referred to as the 
“maritime preemption analysis.” 
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II. NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM: THE QUEST FOR FEDERAL-
STATE COMITY AS APPLIED TO PUNITIVE DAMAGE AVAILABILITY IN 
MARITIME TORTS  
Maritime torts are frequent subjects of maritime preemption, as 
admiralty has long acknowledged that the states have legitimate interests 
in tortious actions within their territorial waters.60 Some examples include 
the establishment of general rights and duties of persons and property 
within state boundaries; the police power to prevent dependency on the 
state by survivors; and the control over “certain local regulations of a 
maritime nature.”61 Further, maritime torts make up an area of maritime 
law that is abundant in common law remedies.62  
Considering recent Supreme Court jurisprudence clarifying the status 
of maritime punitive damages, the question remains as to whether there is 
still a place for state law punitive damage remedies.63 
A. The Status of Punitive Damages After Miles, Baker, and Townsend 
Despite early indications from the Supreme Court that punitive 
damages constituted a recognized feature of maritime law, courts prior to 
Baker and Townsend remained starkly divided over the awarding of such 
damages.64 The uncertainty began in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., when 
the Court was asked to determine whether the mother of a deceased 
                                                                                                             
 60. See, e.g., City of Norwalk, 55 F. 98, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1893); see also 
Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 210 n.13 (recognizing that “[f]ederal maritime law has long 
accommodated the States’ interest in regulating maritime affairs within their 
territorial waters”). 
 61. See In re Amtrak “Sunset Limited” Train Crash, 121 F.3d 1421, 1426 
(11th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that states have an interest in regulating local 
matters without interference of the federal government); see also City of Norwalk, 
55 F. at 108; Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 331–32 (1960) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
 62. See The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907); see also Moragne v. States 
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 393 (1970) (“For deaths within state territorial 
waters, the federal law accommodated the humane policies of state wrongful 
death statutes by allowing recovery whenever an applicable state statute favored 
such recovery.”). 
 63. See generally Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008); Atl. 
Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009). 
 64. See, e.g., The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546, 558 (1818). For 
an in-depth recitation of early (pre-Jones Act) case law concerning maritime 
punitive damages, see David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in American 
Maritime Law, 28 J. MAR. L. & COM. 73, 96–116 (1997).  
340 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
 
 
seaman was entitled to recover “nonpecuniary,” “loss of society” damages 
in a wrongful death action based on unseaworthiness under general 
maritime law and negligence under the Jones Act.65 The Court held that 
such recovery was not possible under either cause of action.66  
Before reaching a conclusion, the Court explained the evolution of 
wrongful death in admiralty; the chronicle began with the rule established 
in The Harrisburg that general maritime law did not authorize a wrongful 
death action.67 In response to the harshness of The Harrisburg, lower 
courts began using state wrongful death statutes to allow recovery under 
general maritime law, which proved a somewhat compatible scheme for 
many years.68 The compatibility declined when the Supreme Court 
transformed the doctrine of unseaworthiness into a strict liability regime.69 
Specifically, state wrongful death statutes often did not recognize the 
doctrine of unseaworthiness, and various “anomalies” resulted, leaving 
                                                                                                             
 65. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990). “Pecuniary damages” are 
“damages that can be estimated and monetarily compensated,” whereas 
“nonpecuniary damages” are “damages that cannot be measured in money,” and 
whose assessment, therefore, entails some difficulty and may require special 
restrictions. Nonpecuniary Damages, Pecuniary Damages, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). “Loss of society” damages embrace the loss of a broad 
range of mutual benefits each family member receives from the others’ continued 
existence, including love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, and 
protection. Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585 (1974). 
 66. Miles was entirely unrelated to the preemption of state law. Rather, the 
case dealt with the scope of general maritime law recovery, in light of 
congressional legislation. Miles is relevant here because of the expanded reading 
attributed to the decision, which then called into question the overall availability 
of punitive damages in maritime law. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 
19 (1990). 
 67. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 213–14 (1886). 
 68. See Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921) (allowing the widow 
of a maritime worker killed in California’s territorial waters to supplement general 
maritime law through a wrongful death action under state law); see also Just v. 
Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941) (holding that courts may apply state survival 
statutes when the injury occurs in territorial waters). 
 69. See Mahnich v. S. S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). The Mahnich Court 
transformed the doctrine of unseaworthiness, previously recognized as a means 
for a seaman to recover for injuries sustained as a result of the negligence of the 
shipowner, into a sort of strict liability regime, under which the shipowner was 
liable for injury resulting from a failure to supply a safe ship, regardless of fault 
or crew negligence. Id. For a more thorough explanation of the historical 
background, see Nicolas R. Foster, Yamaha v. Calhoun: The Supreme Court 
Allows State Remedies in Certain Wrongful Death Cases in Admiralty, 26 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 233 (1996). 
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seamen unable to utilize the more generous standard of liability.70 The 
Court thus created a general maritime claim for wrongful death in 
Moragne v. States Marine Lines to accommodate the interest of seamen, 
the “wards of admiralty.”71 Moragne, however, did not set forth the 
recoverable damages in the new cause of action.72  
Recognizing the change in legal reasoning from The Harrisburg to 
Moragne, the Miles Court looked to pre-existing maritime statutes for 
guidance.73 The Court recognized that both the Jones Act and the Death 
on the High Seas Act (“DOHSA”) allowed only pecuniary losses and 
emphasized that “[i]t would be inconsistent with [the judicial role] in the 
constitutional scheme [to expand] remedies in a judicially created cause of 
action in which liability is without fault than Congress has allowed in cases 
of death resulting from negligence.”74 Overall, the Court was satisfied that 
it had ensured operation of a uniform rule in all actions for the wrongful 
death of a seaman, whether under DOHSA, the Jones Act, or Moragne.75 
                                                                                                             
 70. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 395 (1970). The 
anomalies were threefold. First, in territorial waters, if a claim was based on 
unseaworthiness, general maritime law provided a basis of recovery for injury but 
frequently not for death. Recovery for wrongful death was still governed by state 
statutes, which usually did not encompass an unseaworthiness claim. Second, if a 
death occurred on the high seas, Death on the High Seas Act (“DOHSA”) 
provided unseaworthiness as a basis for recovery. Yet, if the same death occurred 
within territorial waters because of an identical breach of the duty of 
seaworthiness, unseaworthiness would likely not be available as a basis for the 
claim because state law still governed. Third, if a seaman died in territorial waters, 
his survivors could not recover on a wrongful death claim based on 
unseaworthiness because the Jones Act provided only a negligence-based claim 
at the time. Yet, longshoremen—before the 1972 amendments to the Longshore 
and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”)—could rely on 
unseaworthiness, despite the fact that the duty of seaworthiness extended to them 
only because their work resembled that of a seaman.  
 71. See Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 485 (C.C. Me. 1823) (terming 
seamen “the wards of the admiralty”). 
 72. Id. at 408 (declining to set forth boundaries for this new cause of action 
and leaving available damages for lower courts to develop in future litigation). 
 73. Specifically, the Court utilized the logic of Mobil Oil Corp. v. 
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978), which refused to allow recovery of loss of 
society damages in actions resulting from death on the high seas because DOHSA 
limits recovery to pecuniary losses. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 30–
36 (1990). 
 74. Miles, 498 U.S. at 32–33. 
 75. Id. at 33. 
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On the surface, Miles had no direct impact on punitive damages.76 
Nevertheless, some lower federal courts broadly interpreted Miles as 
creating a maritime “uniformity principle” that limited the recovery of 
several types of damages under general maritime law, including punitive 
damages.77 After several years of confusion, the Court revisited maritime 
punitive damages.78 In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, the Court upheld the 
recovery of punitive damages in property damage claims brought by 
commercial fishermen pursuant to general maritime law.79 More recently, 
the Court in Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend authorized an award of 
punitive damages in a seaman’s action against his employer for willful and 
wanton failure to pay “maintenance and cure.”80  
B. Non-Seamen Maritime Torts: A Much-Needed Reconciliation of 
General Maritime Law and State Law Punitive Damages 
Following Baker and Townsend, a few lower courts extended the 
Supreme Court’s logic to non-seamen punitive damage claims in maritime 
tort actions.81 To some extent, however, it remains uncertain whether such 
applications of Baker and Townsend are warranted; the facts of those 
decisions are distinguishable from non-seamen maritime tort claims. As a 
                                                                                                             
 76. Punitive damages were not at issue in Miles, nor did the Court mention 
them in passing. See Miles, 498 U.S. 19. 
 77. See, e.g., Scarborough v. Clemco Indus., 391 F.3d 660, 663 (5th Cir. 
2004). For example, some courts took Miles to mean that punitive damages were 
not available in actions by seamen against their employers under DOHSA, the 
Jones Act, or the general maritime doctrine of unseaworthiness. Some courts 
broadly interpreted Miles to preclude recovery of punitive damages in any action 
by a seaman, whether against an employer for failure to pay maintenance and cure 
or against a non-employer defendant. Other courts read Miles to the extreme, 
precluding all punitive damages actions under maritime law. See Robertson, supra 
note 64, at 139 nn.376–79 (collecting cases). 
 78. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008); Atl. Sounding 
Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009). 
 79. Baker, 554 U.S. 471. 
 80. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404. The Court has previously defined a claim for 
“maintenance and cure” as concerning “the vessel owner’s obligation to provide 
food, lodging, and medical services to a seaman injured while serving the ship.” 
Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 441 (2001). 
 81. See Lobegeiger v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., No. 11-21620-CIV, 2011 WL 
3703329, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2011); see also In re Deepwater Horizon, MDL 
No. 2179, 2011 WL 4575696, at *11 (E.D. La. Sept. 30, 2011). 
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result, the circumstances under which non-seamen may recover general 
maritime law punitive damages must be clarified.82  
Undoubtedly, if a non-seaman is killed on the high seas, recovery is 
confined to pecuniary damages, whether based on a Moragne wrongful 
death claim or DOHSA.83 Three scenarios, however, remain subject to pre-
Baker and Townsend case law: non-seamen killed in territorial waters;84 
non-seamen injured in territorial waters;85 and non-seamen injured on the 
high seas.86 The Court has already made clear that the high seas are “an 
area where the federal interests are primary,” and Congress has similarly 
expressed a concern for uniformity.87 
                                                                                                             
 82. For example, in a recent Fifth Circuit case which addressed maritime punitive 
damages, there was one majority opinion, two concurrences, and two dissents. The 
split demonstrates the continuing unease in maritime punitive damages. See McBride 
v. Estis Well Serv., LLC, 768 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
 83. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 623 (1978) (holding that 
although the Moragne wrongful-death remedy is applicable beyond three nautical 
miles, a decedent’s survivors cannot recover non-pecuniary damages under general 
maritime law that are not available under DOHSA because “Congress has struck 
the balance for us”); Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 233 (1986) 
(holding that state wrongful death statutes cannot be used to supplement damages 
in cases where DOHSA applies).  
 84. See, e.g., Tucker v. Fearn, 333 F.3d 1216, 1222 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that non-dependents of non-seamen could not recover non-pecuniary damages in 
a wrongful death action under general maritime law); but see Viollat v. Red & 
White, No. C 03-3016 MHP, 2004 WL 547146 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2004) 
(survivors of passenger killed in territorial waters may recover punitive damages). 
 85. See, e.g., In re Amtrak “Sunset Limited” Train Crash, 121 F.3d 1421, 
1429 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that punitive damages in personal injury actions 
were not available under general maritime law, even for non-seamen hurt in 
territorial waters). But see Hester v. Cottrell, No. 7:00-CV-70-BR(1), 2001 WL 
1764200 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 27, 2001) (holding that punitive damages are recoverable 
under general maritime law by non-seamen injured in territorial waters). 
 86. See, e.g., Chan v. Soc’y Expeditions, 39 F.3d 1398, 1408 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(holding that a dependent of a non-seaman who was injured on high seas could 
not recover non-pecuniary damages, even though DOHSA was not directly 
applicable); but see Lobegeiger, 2011 WL 3703329 (holding that a passenger on 
a cruise ship could recover punitive damages for personal injury under general 
maritime law). 
 87. Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 233; see also In re Deepwater Horizon, 
808 F. Supp. 2d 943, 954 (E.D. La. 2011) (“But this case does not concern conduct 
within state borders (waters). This casualty occurred over the Outer Continental 
Shelf—an area of ‘exclusive federal jurisdiction’—on waters deemed to be the 
‘high seas.’”). The legislative history of DOHSA contains recognition that the Act 
would confer a right of action “for deaths on the high seas, leaving unimpaired 
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The Supreme Court has provided little guidance in the context of non-
seamen maritime torts in territorial waters.88 In Yamaha Motor Corp. v. 
Calhoun, the Court held that state wrongful death remedies remained 
available for a non-seaman killed in state territorial waters because general 
maritime law did not preempt those state remedies.89 Non-seamen 
claimants have since relied upon state remedies in wrongful death claims 
for deaths in state territorial waters.90 The Yamaha Court emphasized that 
limitations still exist on the application of state law.91 Consequently, courts 
continue to grapple with Yamaha to balance the federal interest in 
uniformity with the availability of state law remedies, particularly 
regarding punitive damages.92  
III. NAVIGATING THE STATES’ ROLE IN MARITIME PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Presumably, the plaintiffs in Yamaha could not argue that punitive 
damages were available under general maritime law because of the Court’s 
decision in Miles.93 The recent renaissance in maritime punitive damages 
has softened the blow of Miles and may have implications on Yamaha’s 
applicability to state law punitive damages.94 The extent of these 
                                                                                                             
the rights under State statutes as to deaths on waters within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the States. . . . This is for the purpose of uniformity, as the States 
cannot properly legislate for the high seas.” S. Rep. No. 216, 66th Cong., 1st Sess., 
3, 4 (1919); H.R. Rep. No. 676, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., 3, 4 (1920). Thus, this 
Comment focuses solely on the scenarios involving state territorial waters. 
 88. See generally Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996). 
 89. Id. at 215–16. 
 90. See, e.g., Kelly v. Bass Enters. Prod. Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 591 (E.D. La. 
1998) (holding widow of non-seafarer killed in Louisiana territorial waters could 
recover loss of society damages under Louisiana law). 
 91. Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 210 (“[I]n several contexts, we have recognized that 
vindication of maritime policies demanded uniform adherence to a federal rule of 
decision, with no leeway for variation or supplementation by state law.”). 
 92. See, e.g., In re Amtrak “Sunset Limited” Train Crash, 121 F.3d 1421, 
1424–28 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding that federal law governed the liability 
standards for punitive damages whereas state law under Yamaha provided only a 
remedial measure); see also Choat v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 675 So. 2d 879, 
884–86 (Ala. 1996) (utilizing Yamaha to hold that a nondependent could recover 
for loss of society and punitive damages under state law). 
 93. See discussion supra Part II.A on Miles’s impact.  
 94. See Galligan & Bush, supra note 50, at 7 (“Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker 
began a renaissance in general maritime law punitive damages recovery.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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implications depends on the resolution of two questions, both requiring 
more thorough analyses of Yamaha, Baker, and Townsend.  
First, although it is now clear that punitive damages are available 
under general maritime law in at least some cases, the Supreme Court has 
not directly addressed whether they are available for non-seamen who are 
injured or killed in state territorial waters. Second, if such damages are 
available, the question remains as to whether recovery of punitive damages 
in non-seamen maritime tort cases requires national uniformity and thus 
excludes state law application under the maritime preemption analysis.95  
A. Availability of General Maritime Law Punitive Damages in Non-
Seamen Maritime Torts in Territorial Waters  
Initially, it is necessary to determine whether a cause of action for 
punitive damages exists in a non-seaman’s maritime tort case occurring 
within state territorial waters. If the cause of action does not exist, there is 
no need to perform a maritime preemption analysis to determine if state 
law may be given effect.96 This initial inquiry warrants a return to the 
Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Baker and Townsend.97  
1. Examination of the Court’s Decisions in Baker and Townsend 
Baker involved a host of civil cases brought by “commercial 
fishermen, Native Alaskans and landowners,” some of whom sought 
punitive damages for extensive loss of property and livelihood, caused by 
the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in the Prince William Sound.98 Exxon 
argued that the Clean Water Act’s (“CWA”) detailed regime of civil and 
criminal penalties for water pollution displaced judicially-created 
remedies under general maritime law, including punitive damages.99 The 
Court held, in part, that the CWA did not displace maritime punitive 
damages.100  
                                                                                                             
 95. The Yamaha Court did not clarify whether state remedies could extend to 
non-seamen personal injuries in territorial waters, but “[n]either logic nor 
maritime history supports restricting Yamaha to only fatal injury claims.” Kelly, 
17 F. Supp. 2d at 599. This issue will be explored below in the maritime 
preemption analysis. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.  
 96. See discussion supra Part I. 
 97.  See generally Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008); Atl. 
Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009).  
 98. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 479.  
 99. Id. at 488. 
 100. Id. 
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The CWA included an explicit savings clause that preserved claims 
for damage to private property from the discharge of oil. To Exxon’s 
dismay, the Court rejected the notion that the statute preserved maritime 
law claims in general but somehow severed punitive damages.101 
Ultimately, the Court saw “no clear indication of congressional intent to 
occupy the entire field of pollution remedies.”102 The Court held also that 
the availability of maritime punitive damages to vindicate private harms 
did not threaten to frustrate the CWA’s remedial scheme, unlike common 
law nuisance claims, which produced liability standards different from the 
statute.103 
Baker may be interpreted as a broad acknowledgment of the 
availability of punitive damages under general maritime law.104 For 
example, the Court termed maritime punitive damages “a common-law 
principle.”105 Pursuant to the admiralty grant, such principle fell within the 
sphere of a federal admiralty court’s lawmaking authority.106 The punitive 
damage award, therefore, was upheld solely based on general maritime 
law.107 In addition to Exxon’s preemption argument, Baker addressed two 
issues that circumstantially support the existence of maritime law punitive 
damages.108 
Initially, the Court considered whether maritime law allows corporate 
liability for punitive damages on the basis of the acts of managerial 
                                                                                                             
 101. Id. at 488–89 (“[N]othing in the statutory text points to fragmenting the 
recovery scheme this way, and we have rejected similar attempts to sever 
remedies from their causes of action.”). 
 102. Id. at 489. 
 103. Id. at 489 n.17 (distinguishing Baker from two other cases). 
 104. For example, see David W. Robertson, Punitive Damages in U.S. 
Maritime Law: Miles, Baker, and Townsend, 70 LA. L. REV. 463, 476 (2010) 
(arguing that Baker reaffirmed maritime law’s recognition of punitive damages). 
 105. Baker, 554 U.S. at 489 (“In order to abrogate a common-law principle, 
the statute must speak directly to the question addressed by the common law.”) 
(citing United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)) (emphasis added). 
 106. Id. at 489–90 (recognizing that the issue of punitive damages in maritime 
law “falls within a federal court’s jurisdiction to decide in the manner of a 
common law court, subject to the authority of Congress to legislate otherwise if it 
disagrees with the judicial result”). 
 107. Id. at 489. 
 108. Id. at 481–82 (“We granted certiorari to consider whether maritime law 
allows corporate liability for punitive damages on the basis of the acts of 
managerial agents . . . and whether the punitive damages awarded against Exxon 
in this case were excessive as a matter of maritime common law.”). 
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agents.109 Although the question was ultimately left unanswered, the Court 
discussed The Amiable Nancy, which is often cited as one of the earliest 
affirmations of maritime punitive damages.110 After ruling on the 
preemption issue, the Court considered whether the punitive damage 
award was excessive as a matter of maritime law.111 The Court held that a 
1:1 ratio of compensatory to punitive damages was a “fair upper limit” in 
maritime cases in which the conduct was not intentional or malicious and 
was without behavior driven primarily by desire for gain.112 It would have 
been unnecessary for the Court to create a ratio if punitive damages were 
altogether unavailable under general maritime law.113 
Exxon did not challenge the general existence of maritime punitive 
damages in Baker and requested only consideration of whether such 
damages were preempted by the CWA.114 The Court specifically noted 
that this argument was not made.115 Baker, therefore, clarified that courts 
may impose punitive damages in at least some maritime cases but failed 
to identify the cases in which it is appropriate.116 Although Baker 
                                                                                                             
 109. Id. at 480 (“[A]n employee of a corporation is employed in a managerial 
capacity if the employee supervises other employees and has responsibility for, 
and authority over, a particular aspect of the corporation’s business.”) (citing In 
re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (D. Alaska 2002) (“Phase I”)). 
 110. Id. at 482–83 (citing The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546, 558–
59 (1818)). Scholars and commentators have shown no reluctance in interpreting 
The Amiable Nancy as a case in which the Court supported the award of punitive 
damages in maritime law. See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 64, at 95. On the 
derivative liability question, however, the Court split four-to-four, resulting in no 
precedential value. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 484. The discussion is nonetheless 
informative of the status of general maritime law punitive damages. Id. 
 111. Baker, 554 U.S. at 490. 
 112. Id. at 512–13.  
 113. See, e.g., Kunz v. Defece, 538 F.3d 667, 678 (11th Cir. 2008) (“In Exxon, 
the Court held that as a matter of federal common law, a punitive damages award 
in an admiralty case may not exceed the compensatory award (that is, a 1:1 ratio 
is the upper limit for this class of cases).”) (emphasis added). 
 114. In the Ninth Circuit proceedings, Exxon presented the broader argument 
that maritime punitive damages were simply unavailable. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 
F.3d 1215, 1226 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 115. Baker, 554 U.S. at 490 (“Other than its preemption argument, [Exxon] 
does not offer a legal ground for concluding that maritime law should never award 
punitive damages”). 
 116. See id. Even before the clarification of punitive damages in Baker, it was 
clear that federal maritime law included a punitive damages remedy for tortious 
property damage when the conduct was egregious enough. See, e.g., CEH, Inc. v. 
F/V Seafarer, 70 F.3d 694 (1st Cir. 1995). Before Townsend, one could have argued 
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weakened Miles by distinguishing between statutory remedies and general 
maritime law remedies, Baker offered little insight on how far courts may 
extend Miles to confine punitive damages in other maritime cases.117 The 
Court, nevertheless, provided further guidance on this particular issue in 
Townsend.118 
Townsend involved the issue of an injured seaman’s recovery of 
punitive damages under general maritime law resulting from his 
employer’s willful and wanton failure to pay maintenance and cure.119 The 
defendant-employer argued that the Jones Act applied and controlled the 
availability of punitive damages pursuant to the Court’s decision in 
Miles.120 The Court rejected the defendant-employer’s displacement 
argument and held that such damages were permissible, for two primary 
reasons.121 First, punitive damages were historically available under 
general maritime law.122 Second, the Jones Act did not eliminate the pre-
existing remedies for separate common law actions based on maintenance 
and cure.123  
The Court further emphasized that the Jones Act did not provide the 
exclusive remedy for injured seamen, as the Act explicitly permitted a 
choice between remedies under the statute and pre-existing general 
maritime law.124 In the Court’s view, the Jones Act was enacted to 
                                                                                                             
that Baker merely confirmed the availability of punitive damages in cases of 
property damage or economic loss with no applicability in injury and death cases. 
 117. In oral argument, Justice Scalia invoked the spirit of Miles and observed 
that perhaps “one of the factors [the Court] ought to take into account in deciding 
whether modern admiralty law in this situation permits punitive damages is the 
existence of the Clean Water Act.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 1:07:55.966, 
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, No. 07-219 (Feb. 27, 2008). Further, although 
Baker chipped away at Miles, the Court did reaffirm its viability. Baker, 554 U.S. 
at 508 n.21 (“To be sure, ‘Congress retains superior authority in these matters,’ 
and ‘[i]n this era, an admiralty court should look primarily to these legislative 
enactments for policy guidance.’”) (citing Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 
19, 27 (1990)). 
 118. See generally Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009). 
 119. Id. at 407–08. 
 120. The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, provides a seaman with a negligence 
action against his employer and does not speak to maintenance and cure or 
punitive damages. An employer’s negligent denial of maintenance and cure, 
however, could give rise to a Jones Act claim. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 407, 415–
18 (discussing the Jones Act at length). 
 121. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 423. 
 122. Id. at 407. 
 123. Id. at 415–16. 
 124. Id. at 415 (citing 46 U.S.C. § 30104(a)). 
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enlarge—not narrow—protection of seamen, and it did not demonstrate an 
express intent to change general maritime law.125 Further, reliance on 
Miles uniformity to bar punitive damages under general maritime law was 
“far too broad” a reading.126 The notion of uniformity alone did not require 
the Court to limit available damages in a pre-existing maritime law claim 
simply for the sake of conforming with permissible damages in a separate, 
statutory cause of action.127 
Townsend is broadly interpreted to stand for the proposition that a pre-
existing general maritime law remedy remains available unless clearly 
abrogated by a subsequent statute.128 To the contrary, some courts are not 
convinced that the decision’s impact is so extensive.129 Although the 
Townsend Court emphasized the historical availability of punitive 
damages under general maritime law, it did not expressly overrule any 
portion of Miles that limited punitive damage awards.130 The Court in 
Townsend actually discussed Miles with approval, stating that “[t]he 
reasoning of Miles remain[ed] sound.”131 Consequently, it remains 
uncertain what value should be attributed to the massive body of case law 
that relied on Miles to disallow maritime punitive damages.132 
                                                                                                             
 125. Id. at 417. Congress has previously abrogated the right to recover for 
maintenance and cure, thus when it speaks, it does not do so implicitly. Id. at 416 
(citing 46 U.S.C. § 30105(b) and § 50504(b)). 
 126. Id. at 419. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See, e.g., Lobegeiger v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., No. 11-21620-CIV, 2011 
WL 3703329, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2011) (“The opinion in [Townsend] 
indicated punitive damages are available as damages in all actions under general 
maritime law unless specifically limited by Congress.”); see also Doe v. Royal 
Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 11-23323-CIV, 2012 WL 920675 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 
2012); Rowe v. Hornblower Fleet, No. C-11-4979, 2012 WL 5833541 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 16, 2012); Boney v. Carnival Corp., No. 08-22299-CIV, 2009 WL 4039886, 
*1 n.1 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2009). 
 129. See, e.g., Hackensmith v. Port City S.S. Holding Co., 938 F. Supp. 2d 
824, 829 (E.D. Wis. 2013) (concluding that “Townsend did not address anything 
other than maintenance and cure claims”); see also Snyder v. L & M Botruc 
Rental, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 2d 728 (E.D. La. 2013). 
 130. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 409–10. 
 131. Id. at 420. 
 132. For example, a district court in Florida wrestled with the continued 
viability of In re Amtrak “Sunset Limited” Train Crash, 121 F.3d 1421 (11th Cir. 
1997)—which foreclosed a plaintiff’s right to seek punitive damages in a personal 
injury case under general maritime law—in the face of Townsend. Ultimately, the 
district court concluded that Amtrak was no longer good law, though it has not 
been expressly overruled otherwise. See Lobegeiger, 2011 WL 3703329, at *7. 
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2. Baker and Townsend as Applied to Non-Seamen Maritime Torts in 
Territorial Waters 
Any uncertainty surrounding the precedential reaches of Baker and 
Townsend is unlikely to affect non-seamen, particularly those who are 
killed or injured in territorial waters. When a maritime tort suit involves 
seamen, federal maritime statutes such as the Jones Act and DOHSA are 
implicated, triggering the potential application of Miles and forcing a court 
to wade through the muddied waters that Townsend overlooked.133 In the 
context of non-seamen maritime torts in territorial waters, however, there 
are no similar bars to recovery of maritime punitive damages, and Miles is 
not implicated.134 The Court in Yamaha emphasized that no applicable 
congressional tort recovery scheme posed an obstacle and thereby 
dismissed concerns generated by Miles.135 As a result, the broader 
interpretation of Townsend—requiring a pre-existing general maritime 
law remedy and an absence of express revocation by Congress—may be 
used to determine punitive damage availability for non-seamen maritime 
torts in territorial waters.136 
The satisfaction of the Townsend framework is easily accomplished in 
maritime personal injury cases involving non-seamen in territorial waters; 
punitive damages were historically available under general maritime law 
for non-seamen’s personal injuries, and Congress has not legislated on this 
particular issue.137 Non-seamen deaths in territorial waters likely warrant 
further analysis. The second prong of Townsend, which focuses on an 
absence of congressional abrogation, is easily met; DOHSA is the only 
maritime statute pertaining to non-seamen and does not apply to wrongful 
                                                                                                             
 133. See generally Stevan C. Dittman, Amiable or Merry? An Update on 
Maritime Punitive Damages, 89 TUL. L. REV. 1059 (2015) (comparing cases to 
illustrate the quandary, even after Townsend, with respect to a seaman’s punitive 
damages claim).  
 134. See In re Deepwater Horizon, 2011 WL 4575696, at *11 (E.D. La. Sept. 
30, 2011) (“As explained in Townsend, neither the Jones Act nor the Death on the 
High Seas Act speak to negligence claims asserted by non-seamen under general 
maritime law, and punitive damages have long been available at common law.”). 
 135. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 215 (1996) (“But 
Congress has not prescribed remedies for the wrongful deaths of [non-seamen] in 
territorial waters.”) (distinguishing Miles). 
 136. See Townsend, 557 U.S. at 409–10; see also Doyle v. Graske, 579 F.3d 
898, 906 (8th Cir. 2009) (adopting the Townsend approach, though dealing with 
loss of society damages and mentioning punitive damages only in dicta).  
 137. See Robertson, supra note 64, at 134, 158–59. 
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deaths in territorial waters.138 On the other hand, the first prong, which 
focuses on historical availability, may present an issue.139 
Until Moragne in 1970, general maritime law afforded no wrongful 
death action to a decedent’s survivors, whether the death occurred in 
territorial waters or on the high seas.140 The decedent’s survivors were left 
without a cause of action, unless the death occurred on the high seas, where 
DOHSA applied, or in territorial waters, if the state’s law specifically 
permitted.141 Even if the state provided a wrongful death action, theories 
of recovery and available remedies were likewise determined by state 
law.142 Therefore, general maritime law historically did not permit 
punitive damages for the wrongful deaths of non-seamen.143 Nevertheless, 
two explanations satisfy the first prong of Townsend. 
First, although the Townsend Court emphasized the historical 
longevity of punitive damages in general maritime law, the Court intended 
the “pre-existing” language to distinguish the situation presented in 
Townsend from that of Miles.144 In Miles, the Court emphasized that the 
Moragne wrongful death action under general maritime law existed only 
because of congressional action—namely, the Jones Act and DOHSA.145 
The extent of available remedies under general maritime law then 
necessarily depended on what remedies were available in the applicable 
                                                                                                             
 138. Section 7 of DOHSA provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he provisions of 
any State statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not 
be affected by this chapter.” 46 U.S.C. § 767 (1982). Section 7 has been interpreted 
as showing special deference to state law by specifically stopping DOHSA from 
displacing state law in territorial waters. Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 215–16. 
 139. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 140. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 23 (1990); see also Offshore 
Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 212 (1986). 
 141. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 393–94 (1970) 
(“For deaths within state territorial waters, the federal law accommodated the 
humane policies of state wrongful-death statutes by allowing recovery whenever 
an applicable state statute favored such recovery. Congress acted in 1920 to 
furnish the remedy denied by the courts for deaths beyond the jurisdiction of any 
State, by passing . . . the Death on the High Seas Act . . . .”) (citation omitted).  
 142. Offshore Logistics, 477 U.S. at 212. 
 143. See generally Moragne, 398 U.S. 375. 
 144. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 420 (2009) (“Furthermore, 
it was only because of congressional action that a general federal cause of action 
for wrongful death on the high seas and in territorial waters even existed; until 
then, there was no general common-law doctrine providing for such an action.”). 
 145. Miles, 498 U.S. at 24–27. 
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pre-existing maritime statutes.146 Townsend did not present an overlap 
between statutes and general maritime law because both the cause of 
action and remedy existed prior to the Jones Act.147 In non-seamen 
wrongful deaths in territorial waters, an overlap issue is not even possible; 
there is no applicable, subsequent statute for the remedy to preexist, and 
thus, recovery is likely allowed.148 
Second, the denial of maritime punitive damages to non-seamen killed 
in territorial waters may generate various policy issues.149 The Court in 
Baker allowed non-seamen to recover maritime punitive damages for 
property loss, and the Court in Townsend revived punitive damages for 
non-seamen personal injury cases.150 If general maritime law punitive 
damages were not available in non-seamen wrongful death cases, it would 
be difficult to justify their availability in property loss cases. Likewise, if 
such damages were available to an injured non-seaman claimant, it would 
make little sense to deny recovery to that same claimant when the injury 
is fatal. This result would place more value on commercial interests than 
human life and effectively reward the wrongdoer-defendant for killing, 
rather than merely injuring, the claimant.151  
Pursuant to the broadest understanding of Baker and Townsend, 
punitive damages should be available under general maritime law for all 
non-seamen maritime torts in territorial waters.152 Despite such 
availability, however, Yamaha provided an additional avenue for non-
                                                                                                             
 146. Id. at 31 (“[W]hen [the maritime statute] does speak directly to a question, 
the courts are not free to ‘supplement’ Congress’ answer so thoroughly that the 
Act becomes meaningless.”) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 
618, 625 (1978)). 
 147. Townsend, 557 U.S. at 419. 
 148. See Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 215–16 (1996) 
 149. Specifically, the policy concerns pertain to fairness and, most 
importantly, uniformity. Scholars commonly observe that one of the goals and 
unique virtues of admiralty law is uniformity. See generally SCHOENBAUM, supra 
note 35, § 3-2, at 60. 
 150. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 488 (2008); Townsend, 557 
U.S. at 421 (noting the established availability of punitive damages for 
maintenance and cure actions and the absence of a statute that casts doubt on such 
availability). 
 151. Similar policy arguments are notably applicable to the possible 
unavailability of punitive damages to seamen. See generally McBride v. Estis 
Well Serv., L.L.C., 768 F.3d 382, 394 (5th Cir. 2014). It is certainly unfair that 
the “wards of admiralty” are not able to recover punitive damages, whereas non-
seamen may, but the better view is that Miles is applicable in the seamen scenario, 
and those uniformity concerns trump issues of fairness. 
 152. See Baker, 554 U.S. 471; see also Townsend, 557 U.S. 404. 
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seamen to recover punitive damages.153 Whether Yamaha remains 
applicable to punitive damages in the wake of Baker and Townsend is the 
next question addressed.  
B. Availability of State Punitive Damage Remedies in Non-Seamen 
Maritime Torts in Territorial Waters  
The Court in Yamaha held that state law remedies may supplement a 
Moragne wrongful death action when the death involves a non-seaman 
and the accident occurs in state territorial waters.154 The Court framed the 
issue as one of preemption, noting that generally, “with admiralty 
jurisdiction . . . comes the application of substantive admiralty law,” but 
also recognized that state law is not automatically ousted.155 Despite this 
language, the Court did not cite to Jensen, its landmark choice-of-law 
decision.156 The extent of Yamaha’s connection to maritime preemption 
rests on the contours of the Court’s rationale—namely, status of the 
claimant as a non-seaman and the situs of the incident in state territorial 
waters.157  
By focusing on the status of the claimant as a non-seaman, the Court 
distinguished between the uniformity issues that prompted it to create the 
Moragne action and those that concerned Yamaha.158 Absent from the 
                                                                                                             
 153. See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 216. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 205–06. The Court explained and rejected Yamaha’s view that the 
Moragne wrongful death action was a uniform, maritime rule of decision, thereby 
displacing state law and “supply[ing] the exclusive remedy in cases involving the 
deaths of [non-seamen] in territorial waters.” Id. 
 156. See generally Yamaha, 516 U.S. 199; see also Robertson, The Applicability 
of State Law in Maritime Cases After Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, supra note 
31, at 100. Though Jensen is not explicitly cited in the opinion, the Yamaha Court 
cited Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921), which quotes the 
Jensen criteria verbatim, in explaining the compatibility of state wrongful death 
statutes with maritime policies. Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 200, 207. 
 157. See, e.g., Attilio M. Costabel, Maritime Law Uniformity and Federalism 
After Yamaha V and DOHSA Amendment: For Whom the Bell Tolls?, 13 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 446, 466 (2001) (“What is troublesome in the Yamaha saga . . . 
is that no explicit, clear, convincing reason is supplied of why, in the factual 
pattern at large, state law should apply without even making an attempt to check 
is there is any interest of general maritime law to balance.”) (emphasis added). 
 158. Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 202, 211 (“Moragne did not [involve concerns] that 
state monetary awards in maritime wrongful-death cases were excessive, or that 
variations in the remedies afforded by the State threatened to interfere with the 
harmonious operation of maritime law.”). Moragne sought to achieve uniform 
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Moragne Court’s discussion were any fears that state awards were 
excessive or that variations in available state remedies threatened the 
“harmonious operation of maritime law,” which begged the Court’s 
holding in Yamaha.159  
Some courts have used the Yamaha Court’s reference to non-seamen 
in an overly broad manner.160 For example, a lower district court in Kelly 
v. Bass Enterprise Production Co. went as far as to conclude that the 
maritime uniformity doctrine was not a barrier to the application of state 
law when non-seamen were involved.161 Specifically, the court held that 
“[w]here [non-seamen were] involved, the likelihood that maritime 
commerce interests would be paramount [was] remote, and when those 
[non-seamen were victims of accidents] in state territorial waters, 
maritime commerce concerns [were] even less affected and state interests 
easily outweigh[ed] the need for uniformity.”162 Such a status-based 
approach is consistent, to some extent, with the Court’s opinion in 
Yamaha.163 On the other hand, it is wholly inconsistent with the underlying 
premise of Moragne—namely, that the availability of an unseaworthiness 
claim should not depend on the victim’s occupational status.164 The status-
                                                                                                             
availability of unseaworthiness—a uniquely maritime doctrine—as a basis of 
recovery for all maritime workers who served ships. Id. at 213 (“The anomalies 
described in Moragne relate to ships and the workers who serve them, and to a 
distinctly maritime substantive concept—the unseaworthiness doctrine.”). 
 159. Id. at 202, 211. See generally Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 
U.S. 375 (1970). 
 160. See generally Gary T. Sacks & Derrick S. Kirby, (in Symposium: 
Maritime Casualties and the Limitation of Liability Act) Note, Wrongful Death: 
Maritime Standards for Liability to the Estates of Nonseafarers: Calhoun v. 
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 216 F.3d 338, 2000 AMC 1863 (3d Cir. 2000), 32 
J. MAR. L. & COM. 339 (2001). 
 161. Kelly v. Bass Enters. Prod. Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 591, 595 (E.D. La. 1998). 
According to the district court, Yamaha “noted that the well-established principle 
of uniformity was not problematic because the decedent [in the case] was a [non-
seamen] and the thrust of uniformity was to prevent inequities or even differences 
in the nature and scope of remedies applicable to seafarers.” Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Ugo Colella, The Secret Dissent in Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun- 
Never Before Published!, 71 TUL. L. REV. 203, 207 (1996). See generally 
Yamaha, 516 U.S. 199; Kelly, 17 F. Supp. 2d 591. 
 164. Because state law governed longshore workers’ claims, such workers 
could bring an unseaworthiness claim provided the laws of the state allowed. Yet, 
the Jones Act barred seamen from utilizing the easier standard of liability that 
unseaworthiness offered. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 395 (recognizing that the Jones 
Act only provides a negligence standard of liability for wrongful death). 
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of-the-party logic is likewise not supported by the Court’s pre-Yamaha 
case law, which made no distinction between non-seamen and seamen.165 
Consequently, the Court’s attention to the claimant’s status as a non-
seamen was limited to its consideration of whether Moragne preempted 
state law remedies and should not be viewed in a categorical lens.166 
The Yamaha Court also emphasized the accident’s situs in state 
territorial waters for primarily two reasons. First, although admiralty 
generally seeks to “give rather than to withhold the remedy,”167 and 
Moragne likewise “centered on the extension of relief,” the Court 
understood that it could not expand available remedies if Congress had 
already spoken on such issue.168 Congress, however, had not prescribed a 
comprehensive tort recovery scheme for wrongful deaths of non-seamen 
in territorial waters.169 In fact, Congress expressly preserved application 
of state law for wrongful deaths in territorial waters.170 The Court was thus 
not required, as it had been in the past, to defer to statutorily provided 
damages out of respect for the uniform congressional voice.171  
Second, the Court expressly recognized the interest of a state in 
regulating maritime affairs within its territorial waters, noting that 
“[f]ederal maritime law has long accommodated [such interests].”172 
Given the absence of a congressional barrier, the Court saw no “disparity 
                                                                                                             
 165. Colella, supra note 163, at 215 (citing Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 
391–92 (1941) (involving guests of the owners of a yacht); W. Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 
257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921) (involving “maritime workers”); Old Dominion S.S. 
Co. v. Gilmore, 207 U.S. 398, 402 (1907) (involving chief mate, crew, and 
passengers); Steamboat Co. v. Chase, 83 U.S. 522, 530 (1872) (involving a 
decedent who was riding in a sailboat)). 
 166. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205 (1996). 
 167. Id. at 213. 
 168. Id. (noting Moragne’s recollection that “it better becomes the humane and 
liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to given than to withhold the remedy, 
when not required to withhold it by established and inflexible rules” and 
recognizing that the Moragne Court left the plaintiff’s state law negligence claim 
untouched, despite the availability of a new claim under general maritime law) 
(citing Moragne, 398 U.S. at 387). 
 169. Id. at 215. 
 170. Id. at 215–16 (noting that Section 7 of DOHSA stops preemption of state 
law in territorial waters). 
 171. Id. at 215 (distinguishing Miles, Tallentire, and Higginbotham). 
 172. Id. at 215 n.13 (citing cases). 
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between adequate federal [remedies] and superior state [remedies]” and 
willingly accommodated the state interest at hand.173  
Like the status-based approach, some courts have interpreted Yamaha 
to “embod[y] an unspoken rule that state interests must always trump 
competing admiralty principles when the two collide in state territorial 
waters.”174 This conclusion is wholly inconsistent with the Court’s 
opinions in both Yamaha and Moragne.175 Although the Yamaha Court 
noted that variations in state remedies “had long been deemed compatible 
with federal maritime interests,” it also recognized that where such 
remedies proved incompatible with maritime law, they “must yield to the 
needs of a uniform federal maritime law.”176 Yamaha certainly supported 
the notion that state regulation of maritime activity within its territorial 
waters is permissible but must nonetheless conform with federal maritime 
principles and policies.177  
Further, the Court in Moragne rejected such a comprehensive 
disregard for federal maritime interests.178 Specifically, the defendant 
argued that DOHSA’s non-application within three nautical miles of shore 
and the express reservation of this area for state law manifested Congress’s 
desire that only state law would govern in territorial waters.179 The Court 
disagreed, finding the deduction of such a broad purpose from DOHSA’s 
savings clause misplaced.180 It was unnecessary for Congress to fashion a 
remedy under DOHSA for territorial waters because such remedies would 
be available under state law.181  
                                                                                                             
 173. Id. at 215 (citing Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 724 
(1980), which allowed a state worker’s compensation statute to apply to land-
based injuries otherwise falling within the purview of the LHWCA). 
 174. In re Amtrak “Sunset Limited” Train Crash, 121 F.3d 1421, 1425 n.4 
(11th Cir. 1997) (criticizing those courts who support such a restrictive view of 
Yamaha). 
 175. See Yamaha, 516 U.S. 199; see also Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 
398 U.S. 375 (1970). 
 176. Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 210 n.8. 
 177. Id. at 215 n.13. 
 178. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 398. 
 179. Id. at 397–98. 
 180. Id. at 398. 
 181. Id. Wrongful death actions were traditionally left to the states. Id. at 377 
(“All members of the Court [in The Tungus, which interpreted The Harrisburg] 
agreed that where a death on state territorial waters is left remediless by the 
general maritime law and by federal statutes, a remedy may be provided under 
any applicable state law giving a right of action for death by wrongful act.”). State 
law later became inadequate only because of the unseaworthiness doctrine’s more 
generous standard of liability. Id. at 401 n.15 (“The incongruity of forcing the 
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Accordingly, no absolute rule exists that requires the unlimited 
application of state law to all cases involving non-seamen maritime torts 
occurring within state territorial waters.182 Rather, Yamaha was meant to 
permit state law remedies in wrongful death actions when such application 
did not conflict with federal maritime law, reaffirming the principles 
announced in Jensen and its progeny.183 
IV. TIME TO CALM THE WATERS THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF A 
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF MARITIME PUNITIVE DAMAGES  
Yamaha illustrates an increased willingness to apply state law in 
admiralty disputes, but the modest nature of the Court’s inquiry and 
subsequent analysis supports only the use of state law as a supplemental 
remedial measure.184 The Court focused on whether actual conflict existed 
between the policies embodied in Moragne and state wrongful death 
law.185 The divergence in potential recoveries under state and maritime 
law, however, presented only a false conflict, as the Moragne Court did 
                                                                                                             
States to provide the sole remedy to effectuate duties that have no basis in state 
policy [referring to the duty of seaworthiness] is highlighted in this case. . . . 
Federal law, rather than state, is the more appropriate source of a remedy for 
violation of the federal imposed duties of maritime law.”). 
 182. For example, a district court refused to apply state law, despite the fact 
that the case involved non-seamen killed in state territorial waters, because such 
application would have denied any and all recovery of damages—a result 
inconsistent with federal maritime principles and policies. In re Antill Pipeline 
Const. Co., Inc., 866 F. Supp. 2d 563, 567 (E.D. La. 2011). 
 183. In re Amtrak “Sunset Limited” Train Crash, 121 F.3d 1421, 1424 (11th 
Cir. 1997) (finding that “the Yamaha Court, while aware that its decision would 
create, to some extent, unavoidable conflict between state law and federal 
maritime law, did not intend to wholly sacrifice long-standing admiralty 
principles at the altar of states’ rights”). 
 184. See Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 216 F.3d 338, 348–51 (3d Cir. 
2000). See also O’Hara v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 254, 256 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“The thrust of Yamaha is to argue that considerations of 
uniformity in federal maritime wrongful actions require only that standards of 
liability be exclusively determined by federal law and that, one such liability has 
been shown, there is no antagonism to such a policy in supplementing federal 
maritime remedies with those available under otherwise applicable state 
statutes.”); but see Robertson, The Applicability of State Law in Maritime Cases 
After Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, supra note 31, at 89–97 (tabulating 53 
Supreme Court decisions since 1917 to demonstrate an increase in state law 
application). 
 185. See Young, supra note 47, at 354 (citing Yamaha Motor Corp. v. 
Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 210 n.8, 211–12 (1996)). 
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not seek to limit plaintiffs’ recoveries and intentionally declined to define 
recoverable damages.186  
The Yamaha Court also did not address whether the relevant states’ 
wrongful death statutes conflicted with federal maritime principles and 
policies because both state statutes were based upon compensatory 
damages.187 Further, the statute that allowed punitive damages required a 
showing of conduct akin to wanton and willful misconduct.188  
As a result, the Court avoided fashioning a “grand synthesis or 
reconciliation of [its] precedent.”189 Yamaha simply allowed plaintiffs to 
fill their Moragne basket with additional state law remedies that general 
maritime law did not provide, but it failed to answer the more fundamental 
question of which substantive law would govern liability for the now-
available state remedies.190 The Court explicitly “left open” this question 
and gave no guidance on how to answer it.191 Yamaha is likely of little 
practical use, therefore, when actual conflict exists between state and 
general maritime law, particularly relating to punitive damages.  
                                                                                                             
 186. See id. at 355 (citing Moragne, 398 U.S. at 408). 
 187. See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 216 n.14. See also Amtrak, 121 F.3d at 1425 n.4 
(pointing out that Yamaha never addressed whether a conflict existed with 
maritime law because both state statutes at issue “were primarily remedial in 
nature” and thus, did not threaten federal maritime principles or policies); In re 
San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 745 F. Supp. 79, 84 (D.P.R. 1990). 
 188. See Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 216 n.14; see also Burke v. Maassen, 904 F.2d 
178, 181 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 189. Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 210 n.8. 
 190. See generally Yamaha, 516 U.S. 199. This Comment assumes that 
separation of the remedy from its governing rules is permissible yet recognizes 
that a previous Supreme Court decision has been interpreted to mean that state 
law must sometimes govern in toto when it applies and that it still technically 
remains “good law,” as it was never expressly overruled. The Tungus v. 
Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959); see also Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 209 (stating that 
Moragne noted issues with The Tungus, but ultimately focused on the 
unsoundness of The Harrisburg). Such an interpretation is likely inaccurate, 
however, considering the historical context of the decision and subsequent 
Supreme Court case law which substantially undercut its foundation. See Calhoun 
v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 216 F.3d 338, 348–52 (3rd Cir. 2000) (disagreeing with 
the broader interpretation of The Tungus); see generally David R. Lapp, Admiralty 
and Federalism in the Wake of Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun: Is 
Yamaha a Cry by the Judiciary for Legislative Action in State Territorial Waters?, 
41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 677 (2000) (arguing that The Tungus did not approve of 
such an expansive role for state law).  
 191. Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 216 n.14 (“The Court of Appeals also left open, as 
do we, the source—federal or state—of the standards governing liability, as 
distinguished from the rules on remedies.”). 
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Because Baker and Townsend support the recovery of punitive 
damages under general maritime law for all non-seamen maritime torts in 
territorial waters, claimants in such cases do not have a need for state 
punitive damages, unless other aspects of state law—such as a more 
generous standard of liability or a higher statutory damage cap—are also 
available.192 Not surprisingly, conflict often accompanies these attractive 
features, which “must be resolved with a healthy regard for the needs of a 
uniform maritime law.”193 Yamaha’s utility in the punitive damages 
context now hinges on a court’s completion of the maritime preemption 
analysis, as applied to each individual issue that state substantive law 
raises about punitive damages.194  
A. Synopsis of Potential Issues Raised by State Law Punitive Damages 
Under the Maritime Preemption Analysis 
Determining the availability of punitive damages as a remedy—under 
general maritime law or state law—is separate from proving entitlement 
to and the specific amount of such damages.195 For purposes of the 
maritime preemption analysis, the state has a strong interest in regulation 
of tortious activity within its own territorial waters.196 The question then 
                                                                                                             
 192. See generally Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008); Atl. 
Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404 (2009). 
 193. See In re Amtrak “Sunset Limited” Train Crash, 121 F.3d 1421, 1425 
(11th Cir. 1997). 
 194. Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 210 n.8 (recalling that state law “must yield to the 
needs of a uniform federal maritime law”). Indeed, although the Court stressed 
that states may continue to regulate many facets of maritime activity within their 
territorial waters, such regulations must “be consistent with federal maritime 
principles and policies.” Id. at 215 n.13. 
 195. Burdens and standards of proof are matters of substantive law that affect 
the rights and liabilities of the parties. See, e.g., Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 
U.S. 443, 454 (1994) (emphasizing that burden of proof is “a matter of 
substance”); see also James v. River Parishes Co., 686 F.2d 1129, 1133 (5th Cir. 
1982) (same); Lancer Arabians, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1444, 
1446 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (standard for recovery of punitive damages is matter of 
substantive law); cf. Fogarty v. Greenwood, 724 F. Supp. 545, 546 (N.D. Ill. 1989) 
(referring to standard for recovery of punitive damages as “substantive”); Reed v. 
Ford Motor Co., 679 F. Supp. 873, 878 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (same). As a result, courts 
have applied the admiralty law standard when the state law standard is 
inconsistent. See, e.g., Delta Marine, Inc. v. Whaley, 813 F. Supp. 414, 416–17 
(E.D.N.C. 1993). 
 196. See, e.g., Yamaha, 516 U.S. at 215 n.13. 
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becomes whether the general maritime law rule at issue requires 
uniformity amongst the states.197  
Several issues may arise if a claimant seeks to utilize substantive state 
law on punitive damages. Each issue should be individually assessed under 
the maritime preemption test espoused in Jensen.198  
1. Degree of Culpable Conduct Required  
Generally, punitive damages are available in admiralty disputes when 
the defendant engaged in wanton, willful, or outrageous conduct—the 
level of culpable conduct necessary to obtain damages at common law.199 
This particular standard of liability is consistent with the primary 
objectives of punitive damages, which are retribution and deterrence of 
harmful conduct.200 A conflict arises between state law and federal 
maritime law when the state law impermissibly deviates from this 
standard.201 
The Eleventh Circuit addressed such a conflict in In re Amtrak “Sunset 
Limited” Train Crash (“Amtrak”), which involved a passenger train that 
derailed into Alabama territorial waters after a tow of heavy barges hit a 
railroad bridge and caused a portion of the track to misalign.202 Alabama’s 
sole available remedy for wrongful death was punitive damages, which, in 
contrast to general maritime law, were available upon a showing of simple 
negligence.203 This disparity created a conflict in the standard of liability 
                                                                                                             
 197. See generally S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). 
 198. See discussion supra Part I.B.  
 199. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 409, 411 (2009) 
(explaining the standard of liability required for imposition of punitive damages 
at common law and thereafter, confirming that common law punitive damages 
extended to maritime law). 
 200. Id. at 411. 
 201. The Baker Court recognized that courts generally limit punitive damages 
to cases “where a defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous,’ owing to ‘gross 
negligence,’ ‘willful, wanton, and reckless indifference for the rights of others,’ 
or behavior even more deplorable.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 
493 (2008). A state standard within this range is likely not an impermissible 
deviation. 
 202. In re Amtrak “Sunset Limited” Train Crash, 121 F.3d 1421 (11th Cir. 
1997). 
 203. Id. at 1423. Alabama law presented another conflict—not unique to 
punitive damages—in that it precluded apportionment of fault among joint 
tortfeasors and contribution between them, while federal maritime law requires 
apportionment and allows contribution in the context of collisions and allisions. 
Id. at 1423–24. 
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for the recovery of punitive damages and thus threatened substantive 
admiralty rights.204 
The Amtrak court balanced the state and federal interests in having 
each body of law apply.205 Federal interests in uniformity and harmony 
were particularly strong because of the involvement of maritime actors in 
a traditional maritime locale and the potential disruption to maritime 
commerce.206 Application of state law to allow punitive damages for mere 
negligence was too great a deviation from substantive admiralty rights.207 
As a result, Amtrak held that Alabama law would govern the measure of 
recovery, but to obtain an award, the claimants would have to show that 
the defendants’ conduct met the standard for imposition of punitive 
damages under maritime law.208  
Perhaps in a recreational boating accident, like Yamaha, uniformity 
concerns would not have required strict adherence to the maritime rule on 
punitive damage liability. Such a conclusion, however, is unlikely to be 
warranted often. The Amtrak court stressed “[t]hat substantive admiralty 
law rights . . .  being threatened . . . [were] a critical factor in considering 
the relative weight of federal maritime interests,” and held that “where 
substantive admiralty principles [were] placed at risk by the potential 
application of state law, there [was] no leeway for variation or 
supplementation by state law.”209 On remand from Yamaha, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit likewise held that federal 
maritime standards governed the measurement of a defendant’s putative 
                                                                                                             
 204. Id. at 1426–27. 
 205. Id. Amtrak used the Circuit’s comparative interest balancing test, 
developed in Steelmet, Inc. v. Caribe Towing Corp., to resolve the conflict. The 
conflict must be identified first, and if one is found, the comparative interests must 
then be considered: “they may be such that admiralty shall prevail . . . or if the 
policy underlying the admiralty rule is not strong and the effect on admiralty is 
minimal, the state law may be given effect . . . .” Steelmet, Inc. v. Caribe Towing 
Corp., 779 F.2d 1485, 1488 (11th Cir. 1986). The Steelmet test is just another 
rendition of the maritime preemption analysis. 
 206. Amtrak, 121 F.3d at 1426. The court also interpreted an applicable, 
maritime jurisdictional statute, the Admiralty Extension Act, to indicate 
congressional intent for displacement of state law in vessel allisions with objects 
on shore. Given that this is simply an interpretation, and the federal interests 
would have likely prevailed regardless, it is without matter here. Id.  
 207. Id. at 1427. 
 208. Id. at 1428. 
 209. Id. at 1426–27 (quoting Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 
210 (1996)). 
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liability. The Third Circuit based its decision solely on the need for 
uniform rules of conduct and liability in admiralty.210  
2. Permissibility of Vicarious Punitive Damages  
Unlike the “willful and wanton” standard applicable to the liability 
determination, maritime law is unclear as to the appropriate measure by 
which a court may hold a shipowner vicariously liable for punitive 
damages for his agent’s conduct.211 The Supreme Court failed to address 
the vicarious liability issue in Baker,212 and thus, the question still remains 
open.  
When there exists no single, binding maritime rule, a conflict between 
state law and judicially-created maritime law is less likely to occur in a 
preemption analysis, and it may be more appropriate to apply state law.213 
                                                                                                             
 210. Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 216 F.3d 338, 351 (3d Cir. 2000) (“If 
we were to adopt the view that the substantive standards by which an admiralty 
defendant’s liability is adjudged is governed by the law of the state in which the 
alleged injury occurred, there would be no uniformity in such standards.”). 
 211. See Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. N. Pac. Grain Growers, Inc., 767 
F.2d 1379, 1386 (9th Cir. 1985) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
909 as standard for vicarious liability of shipowner under general maritime law 
and upholding award of punitive damages against owner based upon managerial 
employee’s reckless conduct); but see CEH, Inc. v. F/V Seafarer, 70 F.3d 694, 
705 (1st Cir. 1995) (rejecting wholesale adoption of § 909(c) but allowing award 
of punitive damages against shipowner for actions of agent acting in managerial 
capacity and in the scope of employment where accompanied by some showing 
of fault by the principal); In re P & E Boat Rentals, Inc., 872 F.2d 642, 651–53 
(5th Cir. 1989) (reversing award of punitive damages against owner of vessel 
where no showing that owner authorized or ratified acts of master either before or 
after accident); United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143, 1146–48 
(6th Cir. 1969) (same). 
 212. Exxon argued that a principal could be liable for punitive damages only 
if it authorized or ratified reckless or wanton acts by the agent (“The Amiable 
Nancy-Lake Shore approach”), while the plaintiffs argued that an award could be 
based solely on the wrongful conduct of the ship’s captain, a “managerial 
employee” (“the Restatement approach”). Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 
471, 484 (2008) (“[T]hough it should go without saying that the disposition here 
[4–4 split] is not precedential on the derivative liability question.”). Justice 
Souter’s majority opinion also does not leave room for drawing inferences on how 
to resolve the issue—namely, who was inclined to uphold the Ninth Circuit and 
who agreed that more than a master’s reckless conduct was required to impose 
punitive damages on a shipowner. Id. at 481–84. 
 213. See, e.g., Byrd v. Byrd, 657 F.2d 615, 617 (4th Cir. 1981) (“Admiralty 
law, at times, looks to state law, either statutory or decisional, to supply the rule 
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Even when a state law would not contravene a judicially-created maritime 
law, however, it will not be applied where its adoption would nonetheless 
frustrate national interests in uniformity.214 
At present, the maritime decisions of lower federal courts on vicarious 
liability for punitive damages are divided into three categories: (1) the 
Amiable Nancy-Lake Shore approach, which holds that a ship-owner is not 
liable for punitive damages for the egregious misconduct of its operational 
employees; (2) the Restatement’s “managerial agent” approach, under 
which an employer is liable for punitive damages based on the misconduct 
of a managerial agent; and (3) the middle ground between the two, 
requiring “some level of culpability” on the part of the employer.215  
As argued to the Supreme Court in Baker, the existence of three 
different standards impairs uniformity because the imposition of vicarious 
punitive damages turns on facts such as where the accident occurs or 
where the plaintiff chooses to file suit.216 State law embraces an even wider 
range of positions, however, and these variations may further undermine 
the uniformity of general maritime law.217 Liability, if any, should thus be 
determined as a matter of federal maritime law, and state law should be 
preempted.218 
3. Ratio of Compensatory to Punitive Damages 
To pass constitutional muster, a punitive damage award must not be 
“excessive.”219 The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of state 
law punitive damage awards based on the outer limits allowed by due 
                                                                                                             
of decision when there is no admiralty rule on point.”) (citing Wilburn Boat Co. 
v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955)); see also Windsor Mount Joy 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Giragosian, 57 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1995) (“State law may 
supplement maritime law when maritime law is silent . . . .”). 
 214. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 402 (1970). 
 215. Michael F. Sturley, Vicarious Liability for Punitive Damages, 70 LA. L. 
REV. 501, 511–13 (2010) (reviewing the three categories of lower federal court 
decisions and citing cases). 
 216. See generally Brief of Am. Commercial Lines Inc. as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) (No. 
07-219).  
 217. Sturley, supra note 215, at 513–14 (listing the many approaches of the 
states). 
 218. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 216 F.3d 338, 350–51 (3rd 
Cir. 2000). 
 219. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 
(2003) (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the 
imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor.”). 
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process.220 In Baker, however, the Court adopted an additional test for 
judging the excessiveness of punitive damages under general maritime 
law.221  
In exercising its maritime lawmaking authority, the Court considered 
three approaches, all drawn from state sources.222 Ultimately, the Court 
chose an approach common among several states, which required 
“pegging punitive to compensatory damages using a ratio or maximum 
multiple,” and the final numerical measure was based partly on a rejection 
of ratios adopted by the several states.223 The Baker Court then established 
an admiralty ratio of 1:1 between punitive and compensatory damages as 
a “fair upper limit.”224  
                                                                                                             
 220. The Court has recognized that states have “considerable flexibility in 
determining the level of punitive damages that they will allow in different classes 
of cases,” and “[o]nly when an award can fairly be categorized as ‘grossly 
excessive’ in relation to [a state’s legitimate] interests does it enter the zone of 
arbitrariness that violates” due process. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 
568 (1996). The Court also articulated three “guideposts” when determining 
whether a punitive damages award comports with due process: “(1) the degree of 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity between the 
actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; 
and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the 
civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003). 
 221. See Mendez-Matos v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 557 F.3d 36, 54 n.14 
(1st Cir. 2009) (“In [Exxon], the Court established a 1:1 ratio of punitive to 
compensatory damages under federal maritime law.”); JCB, Inc. v. Union Planters 
Bank, 539 F.3d 862, 876 n.9 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court determined 
that a 1:1 ratio of compensatory to punitive damages was appropriate in a 
maritime case.”); PAM, S.p.A. v. United States, 582 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (“The [Exxon] Court ultimately settled on a rule where the appropriate 
upper limit ratio for punitive to compensatory damages in maritime cases was 
1:1.”); Jurinko v. Med. Protective Co., 305 F. App’x 13, 27 n.15 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“The Supreme Court recently found that a punitive damages award may not 
exceed a 1:1 ratio in the context of maritime law.”). 
 222. In contrast to the due process review featured in BMW and State Farm, this 
was “an issue of first impression about punitive damages in maritime law, which 
falls within a federal court’s jurisdiction to decide in the manner of a common law 
court . . . .” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 489 (2008). The approaches 
were a verbal formulation for discretionary review; a “hard dollar cap”; or a “ratio” 
or “maximum multiple” of compensatory damages. Id. at 503–07. 
 223. Id. at 506–07, 513 (explaining that many states adopted a ratio of 3:1 to 
be applied across the board but declining to adopt such ratio). 
 224. Id. at 513. 
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An important rationale that the Court expressed for linking 
compensatory damages to punitive damages in admiralty cases is the need 
for uniformity and consistency in damage awards.225 In Norfolk & 
Portsmouth Belt Line Railroad Co. v. M/V MARLIN (“Norfolk”), the federal 
court, sitting in admiralty, noted that while the Baker Court suggested that 
the appropriate ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages would 
be 0.65:1 or less, in many cases, it could be higher; but even in the “most 
extreme cases, the maximum permissible ratio is likely 1:1.”226 A conflict 
arises, therefore, in application of a state punitive damages ratio that exceeds 
the limit espoused in Baker, and the balancing of any legitimate, competing 
state interests is not necessary in this context.227 
The Norfolk court recognized that a Virginia statute—which 
automatically provided for treble damages when a defendant’s willful or 
grossly negligent conduct caused damage to the property of a public 
service corporation—was “strict and inflexible,” conflicting with Baker’s 
1:1 ratio.228 In addition to conflicting with general maritime law, allowing 
triple the compensatory damages “impinge[d] upon uniformity of the 
general maritime law in an area that require[d] uniformity.”229 Therefore, 
the court preempted the state statutory 3:1 ratio in favor of Baker’s 1:1 
ratio.230  
A minority of courts have concluded that Baker did not intend to issue 
a generally applicable rule for punitive damages in maritime cases, but 
instead, sought only to address the facts of the case before it.231 Such an 
                                                                                                             
 225. Id. at 499 (“The real problem, it seems, is the stark unpredictability of 
punitive awards. Courts of law are concerned with fairness as consistency, and 
evidence that the median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards falls within a 
reasonable zone, or that punitive awards are infrequent, fails to tell us whether the 
spread between high and low individual awards is acceptable. The available data 
suggest it is not.”). 
 226. Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line R.R. Co. v. M/V MARLIN, 2009 WL 
1974298, at *3 (E.D. Va. 2009). 
 227. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 497–99. 
 228. Norfolk, 2009 WL 1974298, at *3. 
 229. Id. See also Baker, 554 U.S. at 502 (“And when the bad man’s 
counterparts turn up from time to time, the penalty scheme they face ought to 
threaten them with a fair probability of suffering in like degree when they wreak 
like damage.”). 
 230. Norfolk, 2009 WL 1974298. 
 231. See, e.g., Clausen v. Icicle Seafoods, Inc., 272 P.3d 827 (Wash. 2012); 
McWilliams v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 111 So. 3d 564 (La. Ct. App. 2013), writ 
denied, 125 So. 3d 452 (La. 2013). The majority of courts and scholars, however, 
interpret Baker as limiting punitive damage awards in maritime cases, with the 
potential for even broader application. See, e.g., Duckworth v. United States, 418 
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assumption not only undermines the significance of the Court’s federal 
maritime lawmaking authority, but also ignores the rather lengthy review 
it engaged in to determine the appropriate limit.232  
Assuming a higher ratio is possible in admiralty, preventing the 
possibility of unpredictable and unnecessary awards and reducing 
disruptive legal costs is paramount.233 Baker clarified that maritime law 
requires punitive damage awards to balance the needs of predictability and 
fairness with the goals of achieving punishment and deterrence.234 This 
balance may only be accomplished if state law is prohibited from 
disrupting the uniformity of general maritime law, potentially creating the 
kind of “outlier” awards that the Baker Court sought to prevent in the first 
place.235  
When state punitive damage ratios apply, the only limit on the size of 
an award is due process, and accordingly, the vague, multi-factor test 
previously articulated by the Supreme Court.236 The maintenance of a 
uniform maritime law, subject to a quantified ratio, will create additional 
                                                                                                             
Fed. App’x 2, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (“In [Baker], the Supreme Court 
addressed ‘punitive damages in maritime law’ . . . and held that a jury’s award of 
punitive damages may not exceed the amount of compensatory damages in a 
federal maritime case.” (quoting Baker, 554 U.S. at 489–90); Hayduk v. City of 
Johnstown, 580 F. Supp. 2d 429, 484 n.46 (W.D. Pa. 2008) (“Although [Baker] 
is a maritime law case, it is clear that the Supreme Court intends that its holding 
have a much broader application.”); Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive 
Damages by Numbers: Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 
259, 259 (2010) (“The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker is a landmark that establishes an upper bound ratio of punitive damages to 
compensatory damages of 1:1 for maritime cases, with potential implications for 
other types of cases as well.”); Victor E. Schwartz et al., The Supreme Court’s 
Common Law Approach to Excessive Punitive Damage Awards: A Guide for the 
Development of State Law, 60 S.C. L. REV. 881, 882 (2009) (“Will state courts 
view the [Baker] decision as solely limited to the field of federal maritime law, or 
will the high court’s powerful reasoning broadly influence state courts struggling 
to cabin in ‘outlier’ punitive damage verdicts?”). 
 232. The Baker Court explained that when a case falls within admiralty 
jurisdiction, a court should review the award’s conformity with maritime law, 
which precedes, and should obviate any need to apply, the due process standard. 
Baker, 554 U.S. at 502. 
 233. Id. at 513. 
 234. Id. at 493–94, 506 (instructing that punitive awards in maritime cases 
should be “pegg[ed] . . . to compensatory damages” in a manner suited to the 
circumstances of the case). 
 235. See Baker, 554 U.S. at 506; see also Clausen, 272 P.3d at 837–40 (J.M. 
Johnson, J., dissenting).  
 236. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996). 
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certainty and predictability by avoiding repeated constitutional attacks. If 
a higher award is otherwise appropriate, federal admiralty courts should 
instead invoke traditional lawmaking authority to adopt the highest ratio 
considered appropriate by the Baker Court in cases “involving . . . the most 
egregious conduct.”237  
B. Observation: State Law is Inapplicable to Maritime Punitive Damages 
After Baker and Townsend 
In view of the wide array of state laws authorizing recovery of punitive 
damages, meeting the maritime preemption analysis is substantially 
difficult.238 As a result, courts need a uniform system of maritime punitive 
damages, excluding state law application.239 Development and implementation 
of substantive maritime rules on punitive damages is a task that requires national 
uniformity of paramount federal interests, such as consistency, predictability, 
and avoiding undue burdens on maritime commerce.240  
CONCLUSION 
The breadth of both Baker and Townsend has eradicated any need for 
Yamaha in the context of maritime punitive damages.241 As the Townsend 
Court noted, “punitive damages have long been an accepted remedy under 
general maritime law,” and such remedy is available to non-seamen 
injured or killed in territorial waters.242  
Further, Yamaha’s holding may not be logically or practically 
extended to allow plaintiffs to “supplement” maritime law with 
substantive state rules, such as standards of liability or recovery caps.243 
Those rules are appropriately applied only if not preempted under 
Jensen.244 Uniformity demands that general maritime law determine the 
                                                                                                             
 237. Baker, 554 U.S. at 510. 
 238. Id. at 495–96 (reviewing varying state regulation of punitive damages, 
including ratios of punitive to compensatory damages ranging from 1:1 to 5:1). 
 239. See generally S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). 
 240. For a discussion that reiterates these concepts with regard to insurability 
of punitive damages after Baker and Townsend, see Adam N. Davis, Insurance 
Coverage for Punitive Damages – Time for a Uniform Rule Under General 
Maritime Law, 12 LOY. MAR. L.J. 156 (2013). 
 241. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 242. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 424 (2009). 
 243. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 244. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
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proper measure of liability and financial responsibility attributable to a 
defendant.245  
Availability of punitive damages in maritime law remains replete with 
ongoing development, uncertainty, and inconsistency.246 To foster 
uniformity, a court presiding over a maritime matter that involves an issue 
of punitive damages should apply existing substantive maritime rules.247 
If there is no maritime rule on point, then the court should invoke its 
traditional lawmaking authority and craft substantive maritime law.248 
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